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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CRIMINAL
COURTS
DAVID B.
I.

WEXLER*

'INTRODUCTION

Speaking recently at the Teaching Conference on Criminal Law
and Criminal Procedure sponsored by the Association of American
Law Schools, Professor George Fletcher was of the opinion that the
behavioral sciences unfortunately seem to offer little to the criminal law:
[T]he elite schools in the east are still dominated by two schools
of criminal law that I would call Dead School #1 [emphasizing
the Model Penal Code] and Dead School #2.
Dead School
#2 is most clearly reflected at Yale, and that is the school of
social science and the criminal law, and I think my attitude toward Dead School #2 is one more of regret than of sarcasm. I
wish it were the case that the social sciences had something to
offer us in the study of criminal law, but frankly I haven't seen
anything come out in this school for a long time.
[Mlaybe
some of you will
[know of] an important article that's been
published suggesting, clarifying, social science, psychoanalytic,
or sociological perspectives on the criminal law. I have not seen
anything in a long time, and yet the old insights of times gone
by still prevail in significant quarters of the field.'
* John D. Lyons Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona.
Thanks to Paul Marcus and Michael Perlin for comments on an earlier draft. Portions of
this Essay are drawn or adapted from David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles
and the Insanity Acquittee ConditionalRelease Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1991) and
from David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Criminal Justice
Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsABiLiTy L. REP. 225 (1992).
1. Professor George Fletcher, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Law and Procedure, Address at the Teaching Conference on Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure sponsored by
the Association of American Law Schools (May 16-21, 1987) (audiotape available from Audio Archives International, Inc., Falls Church, Virginia). My thanks to Michael Perlin for
calling my attention to these remarks. See Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, The
Invisible Renaissance of Mental Disability Law Scholarship: A Case Study of Subordination
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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This Essay, however, will show how the therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective may enable the criminal law to profit from some of the
insights that the behavioral sciences provide.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent.2 This approach suggests that the law itself can
function as a therapist. Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles
of legal actors, principally lawyers and judges, may be viewed as
social forces that can produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. The prescriptive focus of therapeutic jurisprudence is
that, within important limits set by principles of justice,3 the law
ought to be designed to serve more effectively as a therapeutic
agent. Therapeutic jurisprudence in no way suggests that therapeutic considerations should trump other concerns; they represent
but one category of important considerations which include autonomy, integrity of the fact-finding process, and community safety,
to name only a few Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, other
things being equal, the law should be restructured to better accomplish therapeutic goals. Whether those other things are equal, however, is often debatable, and therapeutic jurisprudence does not resolve that debate.
The therapeutic jurisprudence "lens" enables us to ask a series
of questions regarding legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes that likely would have gone unaddressed under other approaches. Therapeutic jurisprudence leads us to raise questions,
the answers to which are empirical and normative. The key task is
to determine how the law can use behavioral science information to
improve therapeutic functioning without impinging upon concerns
about justice. Therapeutic jurisprudence, therefore, in no way advocates coercion, paternalism, or a "therapeutic state." Of course,
the approach will likely comport better with the criminal law if
rehabilitation, though certainly not a legitimate reason for incarceration,4 is at least regarded without hostility 5

2. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(1991); DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT
(1990).
3. See Robert F Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Conflicts Among Values in
Mental Health Law, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 31 (1993); David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental
Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 517 (1992).

4.

NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT

13-20 (1974).

5. Id., see also Gilles Renaud, R. v. Fuller: Time to Brush Aside the Rule Prohibiting
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Although the therapeutic jurisprudence approach grew out of
mental health law scholarship, it has clear potential to trigger inquiry beyond the traditional mental health law subject matter. The
therapeutic jurisprudence lens should aid in criminal law and procedure,6 juvenile and family law,7 health law,8 disability law, 9 and
perhaps across the legal spectrum.

Therapeutic Remands?, 35 CRIm. L.Q. 91 (1992) (discussing Canadian and British Commonwealth law regarding the appropriateness of pre-sentence remand to craft individualized
sentences). On the value of rehabilitation in the penal system, see FRANCIS T. CULLEN &
KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982); TED PALMER, THE RE-EMERGENCE
OF CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTION

(1992);

EDGARDo ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT.

VIEW ON THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

A

NEW

(1990).

6. In addition to the examples provided in the present Essay, see Ken A. Gould, Turning
Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged,Dismissed or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. (forthcoming
1993): David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law/Mental
Health Scholarship Outside the Conventional Context of Mental Health Law, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. Hum. RTs. (forthcoming 1993); David B. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance
Through the Criminal Law, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1990). For therapeutic jurisprudence articles in a number of different fields, see the symposium on therapeutic jurisprudence in 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 1993).
7. See Daniel W Shuman, Calling in the Cavalry: The Duty of the State to Rescue the
Vulnerable in the United States (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(discussing the advisability of recognizing a constitutional duty to rescue victims of child
abuse). In addition, the issues discussed in the present Essay relating to criminal courts
could be applied easily to family courts, especially regarding petitions to terminate parental
rights and rehabilitation plans implemented as part of those proceedings. See, e.g., In re
D.M.B., 481 N.W.2d 905 (Neb. 1992) (concerning the termination of parental rights and a
rehabilitation plan relating in part to sexual abuse allegations).
8.See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between
Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991) (discussing the element of competency as
it relates to the doctrine of informed consent). Professor Winick's work in mental health law
regarding the therapeutic importance of patient involvement in decisionmaking can be applied to the doctor/patient relationship in general medical settings. See Bruce J. Winick,
Rethinking the Health Care Delivery Crisis: The Need for a Therapeutic Jurisprudence,7
J.L. & HEALTH 49 (1992-93)
9. See ROBERT A. SCOTT,THE MAKING OF BLIND MEN: A STUDY OF ADULT SOCIALIZATION
(1969). Scott provides an interesting and important account of "how alternative approaches
to rehabilitation can produce radically different socialization outcomes among blind people."
Id. at 116. He suggests that "organizational systems that are constructed so as to discourage
dependence in fact produce independent blind people; systems that foster dependency by
creating accommodated environments produce blind people who cannot function outside of
them." Id.
A promising role for therapeutic jurisprudence would be to see how the law might work
psychologically to marshal motivation of persons with disabilities to function as independently as possible. Scott's discussion of blind veterans, who apparently fare far better than
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Cross-pollination with criminal law and procedure is especially
appropriate because many mental health law scholars are themselves "crossovers" from the criminal law and procedure field.' Indeed, mental health law largely grew from the work of advocates
and scholars who emphasized the massive deprivation of liberty inherent in civil commitment and argued that constitutional criminal
procedure protections ought to be extended to the mental health
system."
One apparent reason for the development of therapeutic jurisprudence is that, with the crumbling of its constitutional criminal
procedure foundation, mental health law is hungry for new approaches.' 2 The same can be said, a fortiori, of criminal law and
procedure.

their civilian counterparts, points to two ways in which the law might influence dependence
or independence: (1) through disability compensation schemes, and (2) through the philosophy underlying the provision of rehabilitative services. Id. at 112-14. With regard to compensation schemes, and in marked contrast to the programs for civilians, "[vieterans with
service-connected impairments are automatically granted financial benefits on the basis of
the severity of the impairment and the circumstance under which it was incurred." Id. at
112-13. Importantly, "[n]o means test is required, nor is the amount of compensation in any
other way related to income from other sources." Id. at 113. As to the rehabilitative services
offered, Scott found that blind veterans were dealt with under a "restorative" rather than
an "accommodative" approach to their blindness. Id. This philosophy provides the veteran
with skills to maximize independent functioning. Id. at 113-15.
Both the compensation scheme discussion and the discussion of a "restorative" philosophy suggest promising avenues for disability law scholarship and reform. Under a therapeutic jurisprudence approach, scholarship on compensation schemes should focus at least m
part on how the compensation method itself impacts therapeutically on the recipients. Terence G. Ison, The Calculation of Periodic Payments for PermanentDisability, 22 OsGooDE
HALL L.J. 735, 740-43 (1984). Likewise, a therapeutic jurisprudence approach to disability
law would suggest that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991), be read and implemented, so far as possible, as a "restorative" rather than an "accommodative" provision.
That is, an employee's disability, or at least an employee's functioning, should not be regarded necessarily as static and insurmountable. Similarly, an employer's accommodation
need not be conceptualized necessarily as requiring the same modification of schedule or
work environment for the remainder of the employment relationship. For an analysis of the
ADA, see Bonnie P Tucker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990: An Overview, 22
N.M. L. REV. 13 (1992).
10. David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 27, 28 n.4 (1992).
11. Id. at 28-29.
12. Daniel W Shuman, Overview, 46 SMU L. REV. 323 (1992) (introducing a symposium
on changes in mental disability law scholarship).
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Therapeutic jurisprudence promises criminal law much more
than merely a new twist on the topics that overlap between mental
health law and criminal law-incompetence to stand trial and the
insanity defense. To be sure, therapeutic jurisprudence has something to say about these and related issues,' 3 but the purpose of
this Essay is to show the less obvious potential influence of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Substantively, this Essay will stray from core mental health law
issues in order to indicate the potential reach of therapeutic jurisprudence in the criminal law area. Moreover, instead of focusing
on more obvious and traditional types of law, legal scholarship,
and law reform-matters such as codes, cases, and constitutional
precedents-this Essay will focus on the role of the judge. The focus will demonstrate precisely how broad the conception of-law is
to therapeutic jurisprudence. 4
This Essay will use as illustrations work that has been performed in therapeutic jurisprudence in two relevant areas: (1) sex
offenders and the plea process, and (2) the conditional release process and the psychology of compliance.

13. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (forthcoming 1993) (exploring therapeutic jurisprudence questions in the insanity defense context); Ken A. Gould, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Arraignment Process, 16 INT'L
J.L. PSYCH. (forthcoming 1993) (discussing the defense attorney's dilemma when requesting
a competency examination); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The
Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (discussing the potential therapeutic, or antitherapeutic, impact of judicial condonation of the "pretextual" features of
incompetency to stand trial hearings); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Be Executed: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 10 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 317 (1992) (analyzing the
Eighth Amendment and due process implications of the decision whether an individual is
competent to be executed). See generally the symposium on therapeutic jurisprudence in 20
NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT (forthcoming 1994).
14. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SC. & L. 17 (1993).

[Vol. 35:279
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SEX OFFENDERS AND THE PLEA PROCESS

One of the most striking features of sex offenders, particularly
child molesters, is their heavy "denial and minimization"'" of their
behavior. Clinicians have studied and classified these "cognitive
distortions,"'1 7 which are evidenced by statements such as "nothing
happened," "something happened but it wasn't my idea," or
"something happened and it was my idea but it wasn't sexual."' s
Moreover, mental health professionals believe that "the key issues
of offender denial, motivation to change and cooperation
in the process of treatment
are all aspects of the offender's
functioning which are just as amenable to analysis and modification as the sex offending behavior itself.' 9 In fact, manuals exist
for the treatment of child molesters which cover such matters as
"cognitive restructuring. ' 20 One approach to cognitive restructuring uses the technique of role-reversal: "the therapist role-plays
being a child molester who uses the various
cognitive distortions, [and] the patients are asked to take the role of a probation
officer, a policeman, a family member, or anyone who might interact with a child molester, and attempt to confront the beliefs roleplayed by the therapist."' 2 ' The role-reversal process is used to lead
the offenders to "rethink their own cognitions."2 2
A therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the sex offense area
might ask whether the law, including the rules, procedures, and
roles of lawyers and judges, operates therapeutically or antitherapeutically upon sex offenders. For example, does the law in this
15. For a further discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence in this area, see Jeffrey A. Klotz,
David B. Wexler, Bruce D. Sales, & Judith V Becker, Cognitwe Restructuring Through
Law: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceApproach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process,15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 579 (1992).
16. Derek Perkins, Clinical Work with Sex Offenders in Secure Settings, in CLINICMAL
APPROACHES TO SEX OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 151, 168 (Clive R. Hollin & Kevin Howells eds., 1991).
17. Nathan L. Pollock & Judith M. Hashmall, The Excuses of Child Molesters, 9 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 53, 54 (1991); see also Gene G. Abel et al.,
Complications,Consent, and Cognitions
in Sex Between Children and Adults, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 89 (1984).
18. Pollock & Hashmall, supra note 17, at 57.
19. Perkins, supra note 16, at 152.
20. Gene G. Abel et al., Treatment Manual for Child Molesters (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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area promote cognitive restructuring 9 Or does it instead promote
cognitive distortion, and thus perhaps contribute to psychological
dysfunction and criminality' It may well be, as one British psychologist has observed, that "many aspects of the justice system
are inadvertently geared towards fostering offender denial." 3 In
that connection, the therapeutic jurisprudence approach applied to
sex offenders produces the following suggestions.
Sex offenders usually are extremely unwilling to admit guilt,
even when the state's evidence is impressive, and therefore, they
often seek to plead "no contest," or nolo contendere.24 A nolo plea
permits the sex offender to accept the consequences of a conviction
without going to trial and without admitting guilt. 25 Indeed, some
offenders will seek to enter a so-called Alford plea which permits
the defendant to plead guilty while at the same time protesting his
26

innocence.

Courts may and often do accept such pleas, although generally
they have no obligation to do so. 27 The acceptance of nolo and Alford pleas from sex offenders, however, may reinforce cognitive distortions and denial. This frame of mind may lead the offenders to
reject offers of treatment directed at decreasing their deviant sexual arousal and increasing their nondeviant sexual arousal and social/sexual skills. 28 Alternatively, the mindset may undermine the
potential success of such treatment even if the offender is persuaded or required to participate in it.2 9
Moreover, judicial willingness to accept nolo and Alford pleas
may make it easy, perhaps too easy, for defense attorneys to ar-

23. Perkins, supra note 16, at 152.
24. See, e.g., In re Guilty Plea Cases, 235 N.W.2d 132, 147 (Mich. 1975) (holding that a
court which accepts a nolo plea must give justifying reasons and that the reluctance to admit a sordid crime, such as sexual assault on a child, appears to be such a reason), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1108 (1977).
25. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 (1970).
26. Id. at 37-39; see Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargainirg, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1280, 1286 n.290 (1975) (discussing plea arrangements in sex offender
cases); Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for
the Criminal Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1063 (1987) (addressing the lack of uniformity in
the acceptance of Alford pleas).
27. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11. An occasional case suggests that trial courts ordinarily
must accept such pleas. See United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
28. Perkins, supra note 16, at 161-67 (discussing treatment techniques for sex offenders).
29. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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range plea bargains acceptable to their clients. If judges were reluctant to accept pleas in sex offender cases unaccompanied by an
admission of guilt, defense lawyers would need to coax more actively those clients who lack plausible defenses to admit guilt and
accept the bargain. Professor Alschuler's written remarks in a
somewhat different context are relevant:
It may often be a lawyer's duty to emphasize in harsh terms the
force of the prosecution's evidence: "What about this fact? Is it
going to go away9 How the hell would you vote if you were a
juror in your case?" It may sometimes be a lawyer's duty to say
bluntly, "I cannot possibly beat this case. You are going to
spend a long time in jail, and the only question is how long."30
Thus, if jurisdictions refused to recognize nolo and Alford pleas, or
if judges were reluctant to accept them in sex offender cases, the
law would induce defense lawyers to engage their clients in an exercise of "cognitive restructuring," including role-reversal. For example, the defense attorney may ask the sex offender how he
would vote as a juror in the case. In therapeutic jurisprudence
terms, the result would be a revised legal arrangement that would
restructure the role of the defense lawyer in a way that would promote therapeutic values.
The therapeutic potential of the role of the judge also could be
enhanced in guilty plea cases if the court engaged in detailed questioning of the defendant about the factual basis of the plea.3" Specifically, the judge could address, on the record, some of the matters typically subject to cognitive distortion by sex offenders. In his
classic study of guilty pleas, Donald Newman describes one metropolitan court's procedure that may be particularly pertinent for
our purposes: a post-plea-of-guilty hearing in which, "[a]fter receiving
a guilty plea from a defendant
the court requires

30. Alschuler, supra note 26, at 1309.
31. See H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102, 121 (1977) (asserting that the form and extent of the inquiry is a matter
left "largely to the discretion of the judge") (citation omitted). Pursuant to some select
authority, judges already have an obligation to probe the factual basis of the plea. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CRIM. P 11(f); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-1.6 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1986). But
see State v. Brooks, 586 P.2d 1270 (Ariz. 1978) (upholding the guilty plea in a child molestation case despite the absence of an explicit statement by the defendant that the acts were
motivated by an abnormal sexual interest in children).
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the defendant to take the stand, under oath, and state that he did
commit the crime and exactly how he committed it."32 Judges
could buttress the effect of pleas with full admissions of guilt by
means of a judicial sentencing policy particularly unsympathetic to
sex offenders who stand trial and offer a defense that the jury rejected and that the judge independently found perjurious."3
A plea procedure that encourages a sex offender to make a detailed admission of guilt should work, therefore, against denial and
cognitive distortion and toward cognitive restructuring.3 4 Moreover, should the offender vacillate and deny his guilt when in a
correctional institution or community treatment program, an "adequate record with which to confront the person" may induce him
again to accept responsibility,3 5 and perhaps "to participate in in-

32. DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHTRIAL 19-20 (1966); see also Albert W Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976) (contending that the bargaining process can
operate in a better manner when judges take an active part); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"Systems: France,
Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 268-69 (1977) (stating that if the judge plays an active
role in the plea process, the plea acceptance procedure might resemble the routine trial of
uncontested cases in the Continental system).
OUT

33. See United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (upholding sentence enhancment under the "obstruction of justice" section of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because of
the defendant's trial perjury); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (holding that it
is proper for the court when imposing sentences to consider perjury committed during the
defense of a criminal case); see also United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the federal sentencing guidelines sentence reduction for "acceptance of responsibility" does not unconstitutionally burden the right to trial), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1026
'(1993). For a therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry into the treatment of sex offenders under
the Washington Sexually Violent Predator Statute, see Klotz et al., supra note 15, at 592-95;
John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent PredatorLaw: A Deliberate Misuse of
the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 700 (1992).
34. See United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321 (6th Cir. 1990) (discouraging full acceptance of responsibility by increasing the sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for admitting other relevant conduct in an interview with a probation officer), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 980 (1991). But see United States v. Faulkner, 934 F.2d 190, 192-94 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the court cannot increase the sentence by taking into account matters dismissed or uncharged pursuant to a plea agreement); In re D.M.B., 481 N.W.2d 905 (Neb.
1992) (deciding that, in a parental rights termination case, the court cannot order a parent
to comply with a rehabilitation plan that relates to sexual abuse therapy when the sexual
abuse charge was dismissed upon the parent's admission of neglect).
35. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 222.
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stitutional therapy programs"3 6 or to participate more meaningfully in such programs."
This new therapeutic jurisprudence approach to sex offenders
and the plea process is, of course, merely suggestive. Ultimately,
the question whether cognitive distortions are impacted by judicial
behavior in accepting a guilty plea is an empirical one. If therapeutic jurisprudence has an influence on criminal law scholarship, part
of that influence will be in encouraging empirical studies. 8
Many of the matters seem readily testable. For instance, there
are existing methods of measuring cognitive distortions of
pedophiles."' Moreover, legal anthropologist Susan Philips of the
University of Arizona has observed change of plea hearings and
has concluded that judges do indeed have different styles of ascertaining the factual basis of a plea:
Some judges described the events that led to the defendant being charged, or had either the prosecution or defense lawyer describe them, and then asked the defendant if he agreed with the
description. Other judges tried to get the defendant himself todescribe those events. The latter strategy
requires more involvement from the defendant and a more confessional mode of
admission and met with more resistance from defendants. 0

36. Id.
37. A final factor which may be relevapt to "cognitive restructuring through law" relates
to the type of plea bargain offered a sex offender. An offender might be charged with the
actual crime the state believes he committed, and might receive a sentence concession for an
"on-the-nose" plea to that charge. Uviller, supra note 31, at 109. Alternatively, he may be
charged with the actual crime, but be allowed to plead to a reduced charge. Id. at 108; see
also NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 105-08, 119 (discussing lesser pleas in sex offender cases).
"Charge" bargaining, rather than "sentence" bargaining, is particularly prevalent in jurisdictions in which mandatory sentencing has shifted discretion from the courts (in sentencing) to the prosecution (in charging). Albert W Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978). An interesting and generally unasked question regarding the wisdom of alternative sentencing and bargaining schemes is whether "charge"
bargaining feeds into cognitive distortion more so than does "sentence" bargaining.
38. Such studies are underway at the University of Arizona. See Klotz et al., supra note
15, at 580.
39. See id. at 581 nn.7-9.
40. Susan U. Philips, Criminal Defendant's Resistance to Confession in the Guilty Plea 4,
Paper Presented at Law and Society Association Meetings, Berkeley, California (May 31June 3, 1990) (on file with the author). Because the law prescribes no precise formula for the
factual basis inquiry even in jurisdictions where a factual basis must be found prior to entering judgment on a plea, that judges do not follow a uniform path in making the factual
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Philips categorizes the judges as either "Procedure Oriented" or
"Record Oriented.""' The Procedure Oriented judges emphasize
the personal involvement of the defendant, while the Record Oriented judges minimize that involvement and view their role as
making a neat record invulnerable to collateral or appellate attack.42 From wide-ranging interviews with the judges in her study,
Philips concludes that the Procedure Oriented judges are politically liberal and the Record Oriented judges are politically conservative. 43 The irony is that, if the therapeutic jurisprudence speculation holds true upon empirical examination, the liberal judges
may be performing a greater crime control function than their conservative counterparts.44
In any event, it would be feasible to undertake a post-plea study
to determine whether defendants in sex cases who, presumably
through a process of random assignment, appear and plead before
Procedure Oriented judges retain fewer cognitive distortions than
those who plead before Record Oriented judges. Alternatively, one
might study the issue of cognitive distortion through a more indirect, policy-oriented approach. That is, one might investigate
whether sex case defendants pleading before Procedure Oriented
basis determination is no surprise. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) ("[T]he court should not
enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is
a factual basis for the plea.") with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-1.6(b) (Am. Bar
Ass'n 1986) ("Generally, in determining the accuracy of a plea of guilty, the court may require the defendant to make a detailed statement in the defendant's own words concerning
the commission of the offense to which the defendant is pleading.").
41. Philips, supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. Interview with Susan U. Philips, Professor of Anthropology, University of Arizona
(Oct. 14, 1992) (discussing Professor Philips' research that will form the basis of a book, now
in preparation, tentatively entitled Ideological Diversity in Courtroom Discourse: Due Process JudicialDiscretion in the Guilty Plea).
44. The crime control function served by defendant admissions in the plea process officially was recognized when, on July 28, 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti released
and published, for the first time in a single source, the U.S. Department of Justice Principles of Federal Prosecution. See JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS app.
D-1 (2d ed. 1983) (publishing excerpt relating to the role of the federal prosecutor in entering into plea agreements). In determining whether to enter into a plea agreement, the government attorney was cautioned to consider all relevant factors, including "the defendant's
remorse or contrition and his willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct." Id. at
app. D-4. The commentary to the standards notes that "[tlhese are factors that bear upon
the likelihood of his repetition of the conduct involved." Id. at app. D-6.
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judges are more willing than the control group defendants to participate in therapy sessions which are later offered to them. If the
results of such studies are promising, a further therapeutic jurisprudence undertaking could develop "model" colloquies for establishing the factual basis of pleas to various sex offenses and other
offenses, and eventually subject those colloquies to empirical
study 4 5
We know, especially from therapists' reports, that denial, minimization, and cognitive distortions are particularly pronounced
among sex offenders and child molesters.4 6 What we do not yet
seem to know is whether sex offenders are unique in their harboring of strong cognitive distortions, or whether other types of offenders-or perhaps offenders in general-are as prone to cognitive
distortions. 7
Reports exist from clinicians who treat sex offenders, but reports
do not exist on the extent to which offenders such as carjackers
cognitively distort, claiming that "I didn't do it," "I did it but it
wasn't my idea," or "I did it, and it was my idea, but I was only
kidding around." If rehabilitation reclaims a legitimate role in the
criminal justice system, the potential role of the judge in cognitive
restructuring for purposes of corrections and rehabilitation may
become important well beyond the area of sex offenders.48

45. See Mary Kay Wheeler, Comment, Guilty Plea Colloquies: Let the Record Show.
45 MoNT. L. REV. 295 (1984) (arguing that some form of standard guilty plea colloquy should
be adopted by the courts).
46. See Klotz et al., supra note 15, at 581 nn.7 & 9.
47. See Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 120 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting the tendency of criminal defendants "to deny or gloss over their involvement"); Gresham M. Sykes
& David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REV.
664 (1957); Philips, supra note 40.
48. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. In Montana v. Imlay, 113 S. Ct. 444
(1992), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a child molestation case to
consider whether the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause bars a state from conditioning probation on the probationer's successful completion of a therapy program in which
the probationer would be required to admit having committed the crime. The Court, however, later dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted, apparently because the procedural
posture of the case called upon it to render an advisory opinion. See also Murray Levine &
Eric Doherty, The Fifth Amendment and Therapeutic Requirements to Admit Abuse, 18
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 98 (1991).
If rehabilitative efforts, either during imprisonment or during probation, are undertaken
seriously with other types of offenders and with persons with grave substance abuse
problems, the Fifth Amendment problem posed in Imlay is likely to arise outside the cur-
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Several current issues m the general law of sentencing also may
appear somewhat different if looked at through the therapeutic jurisprudence "lens." For example, would rehabilitation be advanced
if sentencing courts, or sentencing guidelines, formulated sentences
based upon such factors as a defendant's "acceptance of responsibility, ' 49 or a defendant's "obstruction of justice" for committing
perjury during his or her trial?50 Would it be normatively appropriate to take such matters into account? 5 1

III.

THE CONDITIONAL RELEASE PROCESS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
COMPLIANCE

The medical profession has long known that patients often fail
to comply with prescribed treatment regimens.52 Increasingly, the
health care compliance problem has attracted the attention of psychologists interested in understanding, explaining, and improving
patient compliance. 53 Meichenbaum and Turk present a set of
principles designed to help the medical profession increase patient
treatment adherence."

rent context of sex offense cases. The Imlay problem might be avoided in probation settings,
however, if courts take the view that an offender's denial might properly be used in "determining whether a particular defendant is an appropriate candidate for probation in the first
instance." Gilfillen v. State, 582 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 1991); see also Self-Incrimination
Right Conflicts with Treatment, Home Release Programs, 4 CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 1 (1992)
(discussing the Fifth Amendment issue in a broader correctional context).
49. United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the court must
be convinced the defendant has accepted responsibility in order to reduce the sentence on

this basis).
50. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. For an interesting state court decision regarding the impropriety of classifying trial perjury as an aggravating circumstance, see State
v. Houf, 841 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1992).
51. The sentencing process raises many other normative and therapeutic issues. For discussion of the relationship among the defendant's actual behavior, the behavior with which
the defendant has been charged, the defendant's acknowledgment of what occurred, and the
sentence imposed, see NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 222. See also United States v. Galloway,
976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 429 (1992); Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense
Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550
(1981).
52. DONALD MMICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE. A
PRAcTUrIONER's GUImBOOK 21-31 (1987).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 71-229.
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Their book does not discuss the legal system at all. Nonetheless,
the book served as the basis for a therapeutic jurisprudence exercise in how insanity acquittee conditional release hearings might be
restructured-and how the judicial role in such hearings might be
altered-to enhance the probability of medication and treatment
adherence of insanity acquittees eventually granted conditional release. 5 In this section, the Essay will examine the principles
Meichenbaum and Turk present and suggest how criminal courts
may apply these principles in the context of probationary
sentencing.
A.

The Principles

One of the most important reasons for nonadherence is the failure of the health care professional ("HCP") to instruct the patient
adequately about the treatment regimen.56 Indeed, although physicians commonly seem not to acknowledge it, "the behavior of the
HCP plays a critical role in the adherence process.

' 57

Nonadher-

ence is promoted when the HCP is distant, looks and acts busy,
reads case notes during the interview, uses jargon, asks patients
questions calling for "yes or no" answers, cuts off the patient, does
not permit patients to tell their stories in their own words, falls to
state the exact treatment regimen or states it in unclear or technical terms, adopts a moralizing, high-powered stance, and terminates the interview abruptly 58 HCPs are advised, by contrast, to
introduce themselves, avoid unexplained jargon, and elicit patient
suggestions and preferences. 59
The patient's active involvement in negotiating and designing
the treatment program is of tremendous importance to adherence
and favorable outcome.60 Even giving a patient a choice over some
of the more minor details can have salutary effects. 6 1 To promote
patient adherence, the HCP should linguistically cast the treat55. See David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principlesand the Insanity Acquittee
ConditionalRelease Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1991).
56. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 52, at 67; see also Wexler, supra note 55, at 24.
57. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 52, at 63 (emphasis omitted).

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

78.
81.
81, 171.
171.
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ment program in a manner that capitalizes on the patient's involvement and agreement. 62 For example, directive terminology
such as, "[w]hat you are to do is
," should be replaced by a
softer, more bilateral statement, such as, "[s]o what you have
agreed to try is . "8 Adherence will be nurtured further if the
HCP has high prestige and is perceived to be competent, attentive,
64
practical, and motivated by the best interests of the client.
A particularly profitable avenue of HCP questioning relates .to
the patient's past compliance efforts: "What kinds of things in
the past have you tried that were unsuccessful? How is what you
have agreed to do now different?"6 5 It is also profitable for the
HCP to raise mild counterarguments about the patient's prospective compliance. 6 When the HCP indicates to the patient certain
obstacles and drawbacks to compliance, the patient will have an
opportunity to mmnimze and counter the HCP's arguments, thus
"fostering the patient's sense of control, commitment, and degree
67
of hope.1
A patient presented with mild counterarguments to
compliance who nonetheless announces to a prestigious HCP his
intention to comply will be "anchored" to the compliance decision
by anticipated disapproval from the HCP and by anticipated selfdisapproval.6 8
Involving significant others, such as family members, in the
treatment process is also likely to enhance patient adherence.6 9
Family members aware of the treatment regimen can encourage,
remind, and prod the patient, and can help the HCP assess patient
compliance.7 0 One suggested technique for involving significant
others is for the HCP to bring in agreed-upon family members and
to have the patient personally explain to them the nature of the
illness and the proposed treatment.7 ' When an HCP has a patient
explain his or her medical problem and agreed-on course of treat62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 175.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
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ment to family members, the active patient participation provides
an opportunity to "assess her comprehension, to elicit a public
72
commitment, and to strengthen her adherence-related attitudes.
One reason the presence of significant others enhances patient
compliance is that "[p]ublic commitment leads to greater adherence than does private commitment. ' 73 In addition to the motivational power of anticipated self-disapproval and the anticipated social disapproval of the HCP, a patient who has previously made a
commitment to significant others will be anchored to compliance
by their anticipated disapproval as well. 74 Thus, "insofar as patients can be encouraged to inform one or more people (in addition
to the HCP) of their intentions to follow the treatment regimen,
''
there is an increased likelihood of adherence. 75
When negotiating a course of treatment with a patient, HCPs
can profit from the behavior modification literature regarding "behavioral contracting. ' 76 Such "behavioral" or "contingency" contracting "capitalizes on the patient-HCP relationship by actively
involving the patient in the therapeutic decision-making process
and by providing
incentives (rewards) for achievement of
'77
objectives.
treatment
The relevant literature seems to suggest that behavioral contracting works best when the contract is individually tailored to
the particular needs and desires of a given patient,78 when it defines the target behavior expected of the patient with specificity,7 9
when it spells out the positive and aversive consequences that will
attach, respectively, to compliance and to noncompliance, ° and
when it includes the "specific dates for contract initiation, termination, and renewal." 8'

72.
73.
74.
1880

Id.
Id. at 174.
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
(1991).

75.

MEICHENBAUM

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

164-73.
164-65.
168.
174.
168.
170.

& TURK, supra note 52, at 174.

MICH.

L. Ray.
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The Application to Probation

In Health Care Compliance Principlesand the Insanity Acquit8 2
1 suggested how the psychologitee Conditional Release Process,
cal principles discussed above might be incorporated into insanity
acquittee conditional release hearings and how we might then conduct empirical research to see if those reforms actually work to increase patient compliance with court-ordered conditional release
conditions, such as the taking of antipsychotic medication. 3 It is
not at all difficult to transfer the principles to the criminal court
setting, with the objective of increasing a probationer's compliance
with the conditions of supervised release.8 4
In the criminal context, the relevant stages would be those culminating in a judicial proceeding at which a probationary sentence
is to be imposed, whether following a trial or the acceptance of a
plea agreement.8 5 For example, such a hearing can actively involve
the defendant in order to test the defendant's understanding of
the conditions, to ensure that he or she agrees to them and, ideally,
to allow the defendant some input into the design of the
conditions.
The court can structure and shape the hearing so as to invoke a
number of other important health care compliance principles. For
example, the hearing could serve as a forum for the defendant to
make a "public commitment" to comply with the probation conditions.88 That way, the commitment would be made to a high-status
judicial official and to any significant others, such as family members, whose presence at the hearing the court deemed
1
appropriate.8 7
The hearing can also provide an excellent opportunity for the
court to discuss with the defendant past unsuccessful compliance
efforts and the extent to which the current plan differs from any
earlier, unsuccessful ones.ss The hearing is an ideal forum for
presenting the patient with "mild counterarguments" to compli82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Wexler, supra note 55.
Id. at 19, 40-41.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ance, enabling the patient to counter those arguments and to accordingly become "anchored" to the compliance decision.8 9
As a result of matters aired at the hearing, a plan of probation
resembling a behavioral contract may be approved by the court.
When the agreement is approved finally, the court will have solicited the patient's commitment, perhaps both orally and in writing,
and will have attended to the other important behavioral contracting principles, such as individual tailoring, specification of expected termination dates, specification of expected patient behavior and positive and aversive consequences." A court is free to
conceptualize and frame the conditional release as an agreement
between the court and the defendant, rather than as an order.9 1
Indeed, because the court would shape and approve the release
conditions, the court itself would function somewhat like an HCP,
and the judge should, therefore, attend to the HCP behavioral factors thought to enhance patient adherence.9 2 For example, the
judge could introduce himself or herself to the defendant, be attentive, avoid using jargon, and allow the defendant to tell his or her
story without undue interruption.9"
By exploiting the psychological compliance principles, the judiciary would in essence transform the probationary process into one
that is far more individually tailored to the defendant and into one
that seeks the input of the would-be probationer far more than
does the traditional system. Indeed, the employment of the psychological principles may also be suited to the use of the emerging
"intermediate" sanctions, such as intensive probation supervision,
community service, day reporting centers, and home confinement. 94
So long as the sentencing scheme permits "interchangeability," or

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 32-33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
For a description and analysis of these and other "intermediate" sanctions, see

NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM

(1990);

SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF

INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS (James M. Burne et al. eds., 1992).
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"substitutability"9 5 of intermediate sanctions, so that the sentencing judge may select among them, a judge inclined to use the psychological principles noted in this Essay could allow the defendant
to have substantial input into the sanction selection process.9
Will judges be willing and able to bring these psychological principles into play in the criminal courtroom? Interestingly, psychologists Meichenbaum and Turk had similar concerns about whether
HCPs would "adhere" to the recommendations set forth in their
book. '7 The factors underlying HCP reluctance are likely to apply
with equal force to judicial actors. HCPs are likely to voice the
following reservations about using the recommended compliance
principles: patients should take HCP advice or simply suffer the
consequences of noncompliance; 8 the principles simply will not
work with their particular patient populations;9 9 the recommended
procedures are too complicated and numerous; 0 0 there is simply
no time in day-to-day practice to implement the procedures; 10 the
system does not support frills like adherence counseling;'10 and, finally, HCPs cannot make use of the principles because most HCPs
are not mental health professionals and, accordingly,10 3 have not
been trained in psychological techniques of adherence.
95. On the issue of "interchangeability" or "substitutability" of intermediate sanctions,

see the discussion and sources cited m

PRINCIPLED SENTENCING

329-32 (Andrew von Hirsch

& Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992).
96. This Essay focuses on the role of the criminal court. It should be noted, however,
that the psychological principles discussed mnthe text could also be used by prosecutors in
arranging for pretrial diversion. See id. at 396-99 (discussing the relationship between sentencing theory and prosecutorial processes). Whether at sentencing or as a pretrial exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, it is possible to arrange matters so that the offender or defendant is given the opportunity to provide input into the process and the decision. The victim,
too, may be brought into the process, perhaps for fairness or for therapeutic purposes. Id. at
399, 402. The psychological literature on "procedural justice," tying the litigants' perceptions of fairness and compliance with legal requirements to the "voice" and other input they
are given in legal proceedings, plainly can relate to the therapeutic jurisprudence approach, both with respect to offenders and to victims. For a discussion blending the two
perspectives, see Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of JudicialProcedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433 (1992).
97. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 52, at 253-57.
98. Id. at 257.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Meichenbaum and Turk provide powerful counterarguments to
the anticipated HCP reluctance, and those counterarguments can
likewise apply to anticipated judicial reluctance. Although the
procedures may seem a bit complicated initially, they will soon require less attention 10 4 and will, in the long run, improve the quality
of service. 10 5 At the early stages, one can use checklists as memory
prompts. 0 6 Finally, on the subject of clinical skill, "[n]o great
amount of specialized training"'' 0 7 is required to use the recommended enhancement techniques. 0 8
Judges should take an interest in compliance with their orders
and in better serving society Some surely will. Moreover, today's
law students are exposed to interdisciplinary insights far more
than were past generations of law students. When today's students
ascend to the bench, they should feel fairly comfortable integrating
behavioral science into the legal system.
IV

CONCLUSION

Just as the courts, at least those of tomorrow, may be persuaded
to comply with the conditional release recommendations advanced
above, the courts may also be convinced to conduct change of plea
hearings and to otherwise behave in a manner likely to promote
rehabilitation without frustrating the goals of the justice system. 0 9
Urging criminal courts to become more aware of the therapeutic
and rehabilitative consequences of their behavior, however, may
evoke criticisms of therapeutic jurisprudence, such as that made by
Gary Melton, that "experience with the juvenile court has shown
that judges make lousy social workers." 1 0 Actually, I agree with
Melton that our experience with juvenile courts of the past has
shown that judges make lousy social workers. Therapeutic jurisprudence, however, teaches that judges function as social workers

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 262.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Ted Rubin, Now to Make the Criminal Courts More Like the Juvenile Courts, 13
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 104 (1972).
110. Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is, Too): Human Rights in
Psychological Jurisprudence,16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 386 (1992).
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regardless of whether they know it or like it. Either judges will be
reluctant to accept no contest pleas from sex offenders or they will
not be reluctant; either judges will engage guilt-pleading defendants m a detailed colloquy regarding the crime or they will not do
so; either they will expect a would-be probationer to sign a behavioral contract and to make a public commitment to comply or they
will not do these things. Because judges presumably are affecting
therapeutic and rehabilitative consequences anyway, a therapeutic
jurisprudence approach would suggest that, while they remain fully
cognizant of their obligation to dispense justice according to principles of due process of law, judges should indeed try to become
less lousy m their inescapable role as social worker.

